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Recent Developments

Ferris v. State
After Completion of a Routine Traffic Stop, Separate Reasonable Articulable
Suspicion Is Required to Support a Continued Detention or Seizure
By Kristin E. Blumer

I

n its first opportunity to
consider the issue, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland held that an
initially valid stop can evolve into an
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth
Amendment when continued
detention is not supported by
separate, articulable suspicion. Ferris
v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491
(1999). Once the purpose ofthe initial
stop has been fulfilled continued
detention amounts to a "second stop"
which must be either consensual or
justified by reasonable, articulable
suspicion to be valid under the Fourth
Amendment. Ifelements of coercion
are present and no articulable
suspicion is found, then the second
stop is unlawful.
Maryland State Trooper
Andrew Smith ("Trooper Smith")
observed a Totyota Camry traveling
on Interstate 70 in Washington
County, Maryland, in the early
morning hours of May 7, 1996.
Trooper Smith, using a laser speed
gun, clocked the vehicle going ninetytwo miles per hour in a sixty-five mile
per hour zone. Trooper Smith stopped
the car, approached the vehicle, and
observed Peter Michael Ferris
("Ferris"), the driver, and Michael
Discher ("Discher"), the passenger, in
the front seat. Trooper Smith asked
Ferris for his driver's license and
registration. At that time, Trooper
Smith noticed that Ferris's eyes were

bloodshot and that Ferris appeared
nervous.
After Trooper Smith returned to
his patrol car to request a driver's
license check and write out a citation,
he noticed Ferris and Discher moving
around and looking back towards him
three or four times. At that time,
Deputy John C. Martin ("Deputy
Martin") of the Washington County
Sheriff s Department arrived on the
scene and parked behind Trooper
Smith. He approached the patrol car
and spoke with Trooper Smith briefly,
and also noted that Ferris and Discher
were acting nervous.
Trooper Smith returned to the
Camry and handed Ferris his license
and the citation, but he did not advise
Ferris that he was free to leave.
Instead, Trooper Smith '" asked
[Ferris] ifhe would mind stepping to
the back of his vehicle to answer a
couple of questions. [Ferris] stated
he didn't mind. '" Ferris accompanied
Trooper Smith to the back of the car.
As a result ofthe questioning, Trooper
Smith searched the vehicle and found
manJuana.
Ferris was charged with
possession of marijuana and
possession in sufficient quantity to
reasonably indicate an intent to
distribute. Prior to trial, Ferris moved
to suppress all evidence and
statements relating to the seizure ofthe
marijuana. At the hearing, the judge

denied Ferris's motion, and Ferris
was later convicted in the Circuit
Court for Washinton County. The
Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland affirmed his conviction in
an unreported opinion. The Court
of Appeals of Maryland granted
certiorari to address two issues: (1)
whether a person is seized within the
meaning ofthe Fourth Amendment
when asked to get out of his car for
questioning upon the completion of a
routine traffic stop, and (2) was the
seizure justified by reasonable,
articulable suspicion.
The court first noted that the
initial stop for exceeding the posted
speed limit was justified under the
Fourth Amendment by probable
cause. Ferris, 355 Md. at 369, 735
A.2d at 498. The court focused its
analysis on the actions ofthe trooper
after issuing the citation for speeding
and returning Ferris' driver's license.
!d. Ferris argued that the initially
legitimate detention developed into an
illegal stop once the purpose of the
traffic stop was satisfied. [d. at 36970, 735 A.2d at 498. The court
noted that it had not yet considered
the issue, but two prior decisions of
the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland were relevant. [d.
In Snow v. State, 84 Md. App.
243,578 A.2d 816 (1990), the court
of special appeals held there was no
reasonable suspicion to justify
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detaining a vehicle to be searched
once the officer issued a warning to
the driver, pursuant to a valid traffic
stop. Id at 370-71, 735A.2dat498.
A similar holding was reached in
Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662,
660 A.2d 1068 (1995), where the
court of special appeals found that
once a citation or warning has been
issued, which was the purpose ofthe
traffic stop, the continued detention of
the car constitutes a second stop,
which must be justified by separate,
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 371, 735
A.2d at 498-99. Based on these
cases, the court ofappeals determined
that once the initial purpose of a traffic
stop is completed, a continued
detention implicating the Fourth
Amendment will be honored only if:
(1) the driver gives consent to the
further detention, or (2) the officer
has, at the least, reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. Id. at 372, 735
A.2d at 499 (citing United States v.
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th
Cir. 1994». The court concluded that
Trooper Smith's initial detention of
Ferris was complete when the trooper
delivered the citation and handed back
his license. Id. at 373, 735 A.2d at
500. At that time, Ferris was
technically free to leave, absent
reasonable suspicion or consent. /d.
The court then considered
whether the second stop ofFerris was
a detention in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, or merely a "consensual
encounter." Id. at 374,735 A.2d at
500. The State argued that Ferris
consented to stepping from the car,
which did not transform the encounter
into a seizure. Id. The court
disagreed, noting that mere
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questioning of an individual does not
constitute a seizure; however, the
court opined that if a reasonable
person felt compelled to remain, and
no consent was given, the officer
violated the Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable
seizures. Id. at 374-75, 735 A.2d at
500-01.
The court applied the "totalityof-the-circumstances" approach in
evaluating whether Ferris was free to
leave the scene ofthe traffic stop after
Trooper Smith gave him a citation and
his license. Id. at 376, 735 A.2d at
501. The court noted that the issue
was fact-specific, identifying "certain
factors as probative of whether a
reasonable person would have felt free
to leave." Id. at 377, 735 A.2d at
502. The factors cited by the court
were:
the time and place of the
encounter, the number of
officers present and whether
they were uniformed, whether
the police removed the person
to a different location or
isolated him or her from
others, whether the person
was informed that he or she
was free to leave, whether the
police indicated that the
person was suspected of a
crime, whether the police
retained the person's
documents, and whether the
police exhibited threatening
behavior or physical contact
that would suggest to a
reasonable person that he or
she was not free to leave.
Id.
In finding that the stop was more

coercive than consensual, the court
first noted that the pre-existing, lawful
seizure intensified the coercive nature
of the situation. Id. at 378,735 A.2d
at 502. The court described the
transition between the lawful stop and
the second, unlawful seizure as
"seamless," so that it was unlikely that
Ferris knew that he was free to leave
once the traffic stop was over. Id. at
379, 735 A.2d at 503.
The court also considered the
fact that Trooper Smith never
informed Ferris that he was free to
leave. Id. Although there is no
constitutional requirement that a
detainee be advised that he is free to
leave, the court noted that an officer's
failure to so inform the detainee is
relevant to the determination of
consent. Id. at 379-80,735 A.2d at
503 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33 (1996».
The court emphasized the fact
that the trooper removed Ferris from
his vehicle, placing him in a more
coercive situation. Id. at 382, 735
A.2d at 505. The court additionally
found that the coercive nature ofthe
stop was furthered by the presence
oftwo uniformed officers. Id. at 383,
735 A.2d at 505. Finally, the court
noted that the environment of the
situation, late at night on a empty
stretch of rural highway, heightened
the coerciveness felt by Ferris. Id. at
383, 735 A.2d at 505-06. The court
found that although no single factor,
when considered on its own, was
indicative of a coercive situation, the
totality ofthe circumstances indicated
that a reasonable person in Ferris's
situation would not have felt free to
leave. Id. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506.
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Therefore, the second stop was not
consensual and constituted a seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In addressing the validity of the
second stop, the court noted that it
must have been supported by
reasonable, articulable suspicion. Id.
An officer's "hunch" is insufficient;
rather, the standard is "whether a
reasonably prudent person in the
officer's position would have been
warranted in believing that Ferris was
involved in criminal activity ...." Id.
The court found that mere bloodshot
eyes, nervousness, and a lack of odor
of alcohol, the factors argued by the
State, were insufficient to constitute
articulable suspicion of criminal
activity, warranting the second stop.
Id. at 387, 735 A.2d at 507-08.
The Court of Appeals of
Maryland in Ferris strengthened the
application ofthe Fourth Amendment
prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures in Maryland.
The opinion, however, does not
address the hypothetical situation of
a police officer questioning Ferris
under the same circumstances before
handing him the citation and his
license. The court states that the
transition between a lawful traffic stop
and an unlawful seizure can be so
"seamless" that the detainee does not
recognize that a "second stop" has
been effectuated. In reality, this
"seamless" line of demarcation may
create difficulties for law enforcement
officers in attempting to stay within
such a gray area of the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and
effectively do their jobs.
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